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It was three decades ago when Alfons Bürge analysed the Pro Murena by 
Marcus Tullius Cicero from a legal point of view in the professional literature 
of the last few decennia.1 Bürge closely examined the paragraphs dealing with 
the contentio dignitatis of the oratio, which he called Juristenkomik (Cic. Mur. 
22–30). After such an antecedent, it is no easy task to analyse the same speech 
from the perspective of legal history. After exploring the legal, historical and 
rhetorical background of the Pro Murena,2 the work of Tamás Nótári (associate 
professor of the Károli Gáspár University) aims to analyse paragraphs twenty-
six and twenty-seven, primarily from the aspect of legal history, and due to the 
character of the source, in light of religious history and the history of rhetoric 
as well. Because of the interdisciplinary nature of this study, its subject and 
aim–and therefore its methodological approach–are on the one hand made 
narrower, while on the other hand wider and more arborescent than Bürge’s 
monography. It is narrower because after giving a more general overview of 
the historical and legal background of the Pro Murena in the first chapter, it 
outlines the career of the strategist, lawyer and orator, reviews the opinions 
appearing in the Corpus Ciceronianum and presents the theoretical and practical 
aspects of the Ciceronian sense humour, but does not analyse the whole oratio, 
not even the entire contentio dignitatis, focusing only on paragraphs 26 and 
27–i.e. the eleventh caput of the speech. It is wider since the analysis is not 
devoted strictly to textual content, but also takes into consideration the questions 
arising in connection with it. 
 Following the historical, legal and rhetorical background outlined in the first 
chapter, the core issue dealt with in the second and third chapters concerning 
paragraphs twenty-six and twenty-seven is conservativism in the forms of law 
in the Archaic Age, which is described by Cicero–in accordance with the 
  
 1 Bürge, A.: Die Juristenkomik in Ciceros Rede Pro Murena. Zürich, 1974. 
 2 The Hungarian translation of the Pro Murena see Nótári, T. (ed.): Cicero–Négy 
védőbeszéd. (Cicero–Four speeches of defence.) Szeged, 2004. 73–132. 
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rhetoric situation rather than his own conviction–in a way that provokes a 
smile. More precisely, its austere and pragmatic adherence to the texts of legal 
acts, which sometimes opposes the real life situations and the ius, is designed to 
create the idea of justice. In searching for the source of this rigorousness–which 
deeply interpenetrates the whole of Roman intellectual life–and exploring 
Cicero’s attitude to the literal interpretation of a statute or its interpretation 
based on equity, the thesis makes several side-tracks that do not belong to the 
survey of law, or legal history, but rather to the history of religion and literature. 
The analogies and the consequences that can be drawn from these, however, 
lead to a better understanding of the structure of different legal institutions 
(e.g. the legis actio sacramento in rem)3 and of how they are embedded in 
the antique world of thinking and belief, which explains the wide-ranging 
complexity of the subject matter and methodological approach in the present 
paper. As the survey progresses, these seemingly scattered threads meet in the 
end to form a concise, organic synthesis. The widely laid theme springs from 
and returns to the analysis of one single source–coherence assured by the 
source analysed, the two Ciceronian paragraphs. Naturally, the limits of this 
study do not allow for a full-length presentation of the antique sources related 
to each question and legal institution in addition to various opinions appearing 
in literature, nor do they allow to argue for or against these, which in many 
cases did not even seem to be necessary since our aim was not to exceed the 
limits of the dissertation by exploring every detail of these questions and legal 
institutions, but to create an overall picture from their structural outline–as the 
author confesses in his Preface.4 
 In the first chapter, Nótári attempted to outline the historical background of 
the Pro Murena, comparing the opinions drawn up in other parts of the Corpus 
Ciceronianum in order to draw a line between the political-rhetorical situation 
and statements originating from personal conviction. During this process, the 
author tried to pay close attention to some of the means of the Ciceronian 
eloquentia. Lucius Licinius Murena and Decimus Iunius Silanus, brother-in-
law of Marcus Porcius Cato, won the elections for consulship in 63 BC. They 
also had two rivals: Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the most excellent jurist of the 
age, and the notorious Lucius Sergius Catilina. 63 BC was one of the most 
critical periods of the Roman Republic, because it was the time of the second 
Catilinan conspiracy. As consul, Cicero could have been motivated to accept 
  
 3 Cf. Földi, A.–Hamza, G.: A római jog története és institúciói (History and Institutes 
of Roman Law). Budapest, 2005. 167. sqq. 
 4 Nótári: op. cit. 7. sqq. 
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the defense of Murena against his friend, Servius Sulpicius, primarily by the 
fact that in early 62 BC it would have meant extreme danger to the state if only 
one consul had taken over control of state affairs.5 Elections were necessarily 
accompanied by ambitus, a form of corruption that was first sanctioned in 432 
BC. Acceptance of the lex Tullia de ambitu was forced through by Cicero him-
self in 63–encouraged by Servius Sulpicius among others–in order to sharpen 
the sanctions. It penalized corruption during elections by banishing the guilty 
party from the senatus and denied his right to participate in future elections in 
addition to imposing ten years of exile.6 
 In the Pro Murena, Cicero gives primacy to Murena in opposition to both 
the iurisprudentia and the eloquentia. The question arises, however, as to what 
extent these statements reflect his own personal convictions. Therefore, after 
sketching the career of L. Licinus Murena, it seemed worthwhile to the author 
to have a quick look at the evaluation of the res militaris in the Corpus 
Ciceronianum. He concludes that Cicero generally did not find the gloria 
militaris more valuable or useful to the state than leading the peaceful life of a 
citizen and hence the heroic task of serving the public. The career of Servius 
Sulpicius Rufus is remarkable considering his far-reaching work and his 
pioneering methodological activities, not only from the point of view of the 
analysis of the Pro Murena, but also in terms of jurisprudence at the end of the 
republic. In the Pro Murena, the orator does not wish to degrade the merits and 
knowledge of Servius Sulpicius against Murena. Disconnecting this from the 
personality of the two candidates, he instead compares the merits of the 
general with those of the jurist and decides to the benefit of the former, not so 
much in keeping with his personal opinion but rather because the historical and 
rhetorical situation forces him to do so. The author had also a brief look at the 
“Cicero iuris consultus” or Cicero’s relation to iurisprudentia.7 He concludes, 
that many of Cicero’s works testify to his deep and overall legal knowledge,
  
 5 Nótári: op. cit. 15. sqq. 
 6 Nótári, T.: Quaestio de ambitu. Collega 2001. 5. 43. sqq. 
 7 Nótári: op. cit. 29–52. About the topic Cicero iuris consultus see also Hamza, G.: 
Das Vorbild des Rechtsgelehrten bei Cicero. Annales Universitas Scientiarum Buda-
pestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae Sectio Juridica 24. 1982. 57. sqq.; Hamza, G.: 
Ciceros Verhältnis zu seinen Quellen, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Darstellung der 
Staatslehre in De re publica. Klio 67. 1985. 492. sqq.; Hamza, G.: Riflessioni sulla teoria 
ciceroniana dello Stato. Il pensiero politico 29. 1996. 83. sqq.; Hamza, G.: Bemerkungen 
über den Begriff des Naturrechts bei Cicero. In: Nozione formazione e interpretazione del 
diritto dall’età romana alle esperienze moderne. Ricerche dedicate al professore Filippo 
Gallo. vol. I. Napoli, 1997. 349. sqq. 
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and he was convinced that knowledge of iurisprudentia was a necessary tool 
for an orator.8 Given the fact that in the studiorum atque artium contentio 
Cicero applies the oratoral means of humour, Tamás Nótári also deemed it 
necessary to briefly examine humour and irony in light of antique rhetoric, and 
especially in theoretical works by Cicero.9 
 In connection with paragraph 26 of the Pro Murena as a source to be 
analysed, the author attempted to find an answer to problems related to the 
structure of the legis actio sacramento in rem in the second chapter. In view of 
the history of Roman religion and the field of ius sacrum, he tried to exploit 
the conclusions that could be drawn from these fields. As the height the Juris-
tenkomik, Cicero describes one version of the manum consere ceremony applied 
to the legis actio sacramento in rem plots of land. After placing the act of manum 
consertum within the organisational procedure of the legis actio, it seemed 
useful to the author to observe how, why, and to what extent the preoccupation 
with text so mocked by Cicero characterised Roman (legal) thinking. Beginning 
with the well-known fact that one lost a lawsuit if he made even a single verbal 
mistake in his speech during the process of the legis actio, the author has 
examined many examples to observe the power of verbality, more precisely 
that of the spoken word, to create reality, as manifest in the ius sacrum and in 
religious thinking. From these, one can gain a clear picture of the neuroticly 
rigorous connection between Roman religion and jurisprudence of the Archaic 
Age and the spoken word. While conducting research into the symbolic meaning 
behind use of the rod instead of the lance as the symbol of ownership in the 
legis actio sacramento in rem, the author observed many cases of the applica-
tion of the rod and lance and their relation to the dominium and the imperium, 
he paid special attention to the lituus of the augur, the commoetaculum of the 
flamen Dialis and the fasces of the lictores.10 
 From all of this, it can clearly bee drawn the conclusion, that the rod and 
the lance served as generally accepted symbols of power in Roman culture, not 
only in rituals connected with the legis actio sacramento in rem ceremony, 
  
 8 Nótári, T.: De oratoris perfecti institutione. Collega 2003. 3. 47. sqq. 
 9 See also Nótári, T.: Studiorum atque artium contentio (Cic. Mur. 22–30). Aetas 1999. 
1–2. 224. sqq.; Nótári, T.: Jogtudomány és retorika – Cicero pro Murena 26. Jogtudományi 
Közlöny 2001. 12. 470. sqq. 
 10 See also Nótári, T.: On Some Aspects of the Roman Concept of Authority. Acta 
Juridica Hungarica 46 (2005) 95. sqq.; Nótári, T.: Festuca autem utebantur quasi hastae 
loco. Acta Facultattisi Politico-Iuridicae Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de 
Rolando Eötvös nominatae. 51. 2004. 133. sqq.; Nótári, T.: Remarks on the Origin of the 
legis actio sacramento in rem. Acta Juridica Hungarica 47 (2006) 133. sqq. 
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which belongs to the ius privatum, but also in the case of many procedures and 
institutions belonging to the ius publicum and the ius sacrum. The ius fetiale 
(the archaic law of war and peace) and the legis actio sacramento in rem 
offered many parallels, and there were many features common to the structure 
of the vindicatio and also to one of the plots in Plautus’ comedy, Casina, in 
which the right of disposition over a slave girl was decided through battle 
accompanied by an ordeal. These examples and the accompanying arguments 
lead the author to the following–quite convincing–theory. Opinions formed in 
opposition to one another, and which search for the origin of the legis actio 
sacramento in rem either in the realm of private battle or in sacredness, serve 
to strengthen each other and reach the same conclusion, and can therefore be 
integrated into a single theory. The sacred element can be clearly traced in the 
procedure of the vindicatio, either from the oath, the sacramentum, or in the 
form of literal compliance with the carmen to be pronounced. One can find the 
motive for the battle either in the etymology of the vindicatio or in the appli-
cation of the lance, but it was the hasta that held an additional sacral content 
in the imagination of the Romans, which cannot be neglected in the case of 
archaic civil law either. Applying the rules of this genre, Plaute presents a sort 
of a property case, the result of which was determined by a supernatural 
decision,–meaning the outcome of the controlled and restricted private battle 
defined by sortio. On this basis, the author assumes that the procedure of the 
legis actio sacramento in rem as we know it today was originally an ordeal 
fought with arms.11 
 In the third chapter the author studied paragraph 27 of the Pro Murena, 
beginning with the notes related to marital law, after which he tried to find the 
place of the statement “in omni denique iure civili aequitatem relinquerunt, 
verba ipsa tenuerunt” in the context of legal history and Cicero’s works. 
Observing the confarreatio among the acts that the manus originates from, and 
the marriage ceremonies, one could clearly see that in the example the orator 
cited, Cicero made an ironic reference to the sentence “ubi tu Gaius, ego Gaia”–
which corresponds with the argumentation and translation of Gary Forsythe12–
a sentence the author interpreted as meaning “where thou art happy, I am 
happy”. In the course of these examinations, Nótári devoted some time to the 
presence of flamen Dialis in the confarreatio, and concluded–with the help of 
the parallels drawn from the cult of Zeus Naios of Dodona–that part of the 
  
 11 Nótári: op. cit. 53. sqq. 
 12 Forsythe, G.: Ubi tu gaius, ego gaia. New Light on an Old Roman Legal Saw. Historia 
45 (1996) 240. sq. 
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instructions regarding the flamen and the flaminica Dialis hide hierogamic 
notions, which must have had a great significance in the ritual guarantees of 
fertility in marriage.13 When talking about the status of women Cicero 
mentions that women were generally placed under power. It seemed logical, 
therefore, to more thoroughly examine certain institutions of the manus mariti 
and also of the patria potestas–because of the analogies based on the character 
of the sources.14 Regarding the question of whether the uxor in manu is a 
member of the agnatio, the author followed the observations of Róbert Brósz 
and gave a negative answer.15  
 In the second part of this chapter the author discussed at length the aspect 
that archaic law insisted on the precise order of the pronounced words 
regarding the clarification of Cicero’s comment “in omni denique iure civili 
aequitatem relinquerunt, verba ipsa tenuerunt”. Considering that Cicero placed 
emphasis on the contradiction between verba and aequitas, as a guideline 
Tamás Nótári tried to trace developments in the meaning of the expression 
interpretatio, during which the interpretatio merged aspects of the religious 
sphere and grammar and eventually reached the meaning of interpretation that 
was determinant in the Classic Age. The author then studied the proverb 
“Summum ius summa iniuria”, which became known in Cicero's works and 
occupied a significant place among the maxims of the logic of law that 
functioned as a means of legal interpretation, by examining its appearance in 
antique literature, such as in the works of Terence, Columella and Cicero. The 
meaning of proverb crystallized in the writings of the latter, according to 
which it signifies the over-extended application and enforcement of law in bad 
faith within the process of the interpretatio iuris, playing off the word of the 
law against its meaning. The sentence “ius est ars boni et aequi”, in harmony 
with the spirit of Cicero in the Pro Murena, formulates one of the most 
comprehensive fundamental principles of the interpretatio, which aims to offer 
protection against the extreme literal interpretation and application of the 
  
 13 Cf. Nótári, T.: The Function of the Flamen Dialis in the Marriage Ceremony. 
Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae Juridica 
45. 2004. 57. sqq. 
 14 Nótári, T.: De iure vitae necisque et exponendi. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1998. 421. 
sqq.; Nótári, T.: De matrimonio cum manu. Jogtörténeti Szemle 2005. 2. 52. sqq.; Nótári, 
T.: Quelques remarques sur le ius vitae necisque et le ius exponendi. Studia Iuridica 
Caroliensia I. 2006. 169. sqq. 
 15 Nótári: op. cit. 101. sqq. See also Brósz, R.: Ist die uxor in manu ein Agnat? Annales 
Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando Eötvös nominatae Juridica 18. 
1976. 3. sqq. 
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summum ius. During the interpretation of this sentence, the author concluded 
that it became a significant means of legal development as an interaction of 
iurisprudentia and eloquentia.16 
 Finally, while examining the historical background of Pro Caecina, and 
some sources connected to the interdictum de vi armata, the interdictum uti 
possidetis and the deductio, the author studied the disposition used by Cicero 
in the oratio, which exploited the opposition between verba and aequitas, and 
between scriptum and sententia. The author observed the way in which Cicero 
regulated his argument according to the actual situation and the interest of the 
trial rather than according to abstract principles. In doing so, the orator 
managed–with unprecedented rhetorical genius–to make the literal interpre-
tation of law triumph by using tools of oratory that were created precisely for 
application against the literal interpretation of law.17 
 At this stage, an explanation must be given for the title “Law, religion and 
rhetoric. Studia Mureniana”. The speeches of Cicero had practical motivations. 
The lessons that can be drawn from them concerning law and order and the 
legal procedure of the given age are necessary consequences, and the legal 
themes outlined in them are the means rather than the aims of the orator. 
When examining these speeches, one cannot make a strict separation between 
legal and philological questions. Favouring one aspect exclusively to the 
detriment of the other would mean destroying the organic and structural unity 
of the source, and this approach would also oppose the thinking of Cicero, who 
always aimed at complexity. In Rome, especially the Rome of the Archaic 
Age, legal and sacred beliefs formed an organic unity. According to today’s 
taxonomy, it would be justified to draw a distinction between the two, but the 
dangers present in the unjustified application of these modern categories in 
the Antique Age could hardly be avoided. If the author tries to accept this 
complexity, the reader might come nearer to the thinking of the Romans, who 
made almost no distinction between religion and politics. This is especially 
true in light of the fact that the examples cited in Cicero’s Pro Murena–which 
refer to the moments of the legis actio sacramento and coemptio–originate 
from the organic unit of the ius and the sacrum. Tamás Nótári adjuncted the 
notes containing valuable informations at the end of the main part of his text,18 
  
 16 See also Nótári, T.: Summum ius summa iniuria–Comments on the Historical 
Background of a Legal Maxim of Interpretation. Acta Juridica Hungarica 45 (2004) 
301. sqq. 
 17 Nótári: op. cit. 137. sqq. 
 18 Ibid. 155–233. 
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and encomplished his monography not only with lists of the abbreviated 
antique sources and modern bibliographical references, but also with two 
indices of quoted sources and subjects.19 On our part we would regard it as 
most desirable, if the author published the whole monography–useful both for 






 19 Ibid. 235. sqq. 
